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of application when mineral interests are involved. The previous
cases, however, have indicated that the doctrine of after-acquired
title is "equally"' 9 applicable to the sale of mineral interests.
Carl F. Walker
MINERAL RIGHTS-SERVITUDES-PRESCRIPTIONPUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE

Watkins, defendant, sold land to Wise, plaintiff, on July 13,
1929, reserving to himself a mineral servitude. W. T. Gleason
sold other land to R. R. Gleason, another defendant, on December 31, 1932, reserving a mineral servitude. On April 6, 1934,
R. R. Gleason sold this land to Wise, reserving to himself the
minerals previously reserved by W. T. Gleason. On April 30,
1936, Wise and Watkins, and Wise and W. T. Gleason executed
mineral leases on both tracts of land. On October 21, 1940, these
leases were extended to April 30, 1943. On July 6, 1943, Wise,
Watkins, and W. T. Gleason executed another lease in which
Wise -stated that it was his intention "to admit ownership" of the
minerals in W. T. Gleason and Watkins, "and extend the duration thereof." This lease was notarized and recorded. W. T.
Gleason sold his mineral interest to R. R. Gleason. Thereafter
other defendants purchased portions of R. R. Gleason's mineral
interest, relying on the joint lease. Wise brought suits against
Watkins, Gleason, and Gleason's vendees alleging slander of title.
Held, (1) In a sale of land, attempted withholding of mineral
rights not then belonging to the vendor is not sufficient acknowledgment to interrupt prescription. (2) A servitude prescribed
for ten years non-user is a dead thing, and cannot be revived
by the renunciation of prescription. (3) Vendees of mineral
rights cannot rely on one instrument of the public records and
disregard others showing the lapse of more than ten years since
the creation of the servitude. Wise v. Watkins, Wise & Gleason,
62 So. 2d 653 (La. 1952).
In Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co.,'
the court held that the expression, "all mineral rights are expressly reserved, having heretofore been sold by the present
vendor . . .- 2 was sufficient acknowledgment to interrupt the
19. See note 2 supra.
1. 149 La. 100, 88 So. 723 (1921).
2. 149 La. 100, 105, 88 So. 723, 724.
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running of prescription on a mineral servitude. Since that holding, the court has evolved the express acknowledgment-intention
doctrine, holding that in order to interrupt prescription, an ack-3
nowledgment must be made with the express intent to interrupt.
In the instant case, the deed which defendants claimed had interrupted prescription provided that "the Grantor herein reserves
one-half of all oil, gas, and other minerals . . .which has here'4
tofore been reserved by W. T. Gleason in sale to this Grantor.
The court, in rejecting defendant's contention that the FrostJohnson case was controlling, held, "we do not think it is a
sound pronouncement of law and in accord with the later interpretations by this Court, of Article 3520 of the Civil Code relating
to acknowledgments, and we, therefore, do not choose to follow
it even though the reservation is of similar import to the one
5
involved herein."
Defendants also contended that the joint lease, executed
after the running of prescription, was a renunciation of prescription." Article 34607 of the Civil Code allows the renunciation of
prescription once it is acquired, but prohibits the renunciation of
prescription in advance. The court has held that the portion of
this article which prohibits the advance renunciation of prescription is applicable to mineral servitudes.8 However, in Haynes v.
King,9 the court expressed doubt that a mineral servitude could
be revived after prescription had run, even by renunciation of
the prescription.1 0 In the instant case the court held that since a
servitude is extinguished" by ten years non-user, "it would be
3. Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1936);
Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929).
4. 62 So. 2d 653, 654 (La. 1952).

5. Id. at 655.
6. The

clause

in

the

joint

lease

which

defendants

contended

had

renounced prescription provided: "C. Baxter Wise in signing this lease
with William T. Gleason and R. D. Watkins, recognizes that William T.
Gleason is the owner . . . and admits that it is his intention as the owner of

the fee simple title, to admit ownership and extend the duration thereof."
7. "One can not renounce a prescription not yet acquired, but it is lawful
to renounce prescription when once acquired."
8. Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91 So.
765 (1921).
9. 219 La. 160, 52 So. 2d 531 (1951).
10. 219 La. 160, 182, 52 So. 2d 531, 539. "The language of the cases indicates that a mineral servitude cannot be revived after it is extinguished by
prescription." The court made no holding on this point, however; the decision was that since the purported renunciation had not been recorded, it

could not affect the plaintiff's rights.

11. Art. 789, La. Civil Code of 1870:

"A right to servitude is extinguished

by the non-usage of the same during ten years."
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inconsistent to apply this article [3460] ....
,,12
Citing cases referring to a prescribed servitude as a 'dead thing,"'1 3 the court con12. 62 So. 2d 653, 655 (La. 1952).
The court seemed to feel that the word "extinguished" used in Article 789
precluded the possibility of a revival of the servitude by renunciation of the
acquired prescription. It is submitted that the word "extinguished," as
applied to a prescribed servitude, is no more final than when used to
describe the effect of all prescribed obligations. Article 2130 provides: "Obligations are extinguished: . . . By prescription, which shall be treated of in
a subsequent title." (Italics supplied.) The court has held that prescription
acquired against conventional obligations can be renounced. Levistones v.
Marigny, 13 La. Ann. 353 (1858); Gauche v. Gondran, 20 La. Ann. 156 (1868).
Article 3459 describes the effect of prescription as "a peremptory and
perpetual bar to every species of action, real or personal ..
" (Italics supplied.) Yet immediately following this strong statement is Article 3460,
which allows the renunciation of acquired prescription. Article 3471 provides:
"The rules above laid down [among which is Article 3460] are common to
prescriptions by which property is acquired and those by which debts are
released."
(Italics supplied.) The prescription which releases a servient
estate is classified as a prescription which operates as a release from debt
(Article 3529).
Articles 789 and 2130 are borrowed from the French Civil Code. The
redactors of the French Code do not seem to have intended the word "extinguished" to convey a meaning which would prevent the renunciation of
acquired prescription. M. Bigot-Preameneu, discussing the articles dealing
with prescription before the French legislative assembly, said: "Les obligations s'eteignent par la prescription, lorsque ceux envers qui elles ont 6t6
contract~es ont ndgligd pendant le temps qui la loi a fix6, d'exercer leur
droits.
"Lorsque le temps necessaire pour prescrire s'est decould, on pent renoncer
au droit ainsi acquis..
" 10 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Preparatories du Code Civil, Discussions, 573, 576 (1856). (Obligations are extinguished by prescription, when those who have contracted the obligation have
neglected, during the time which the law has fixed, to exercise their rights.
When the time necessary to prescribe has past, one is able to renounce the
right thus acquired. . . .) (Italics supplied.)
Planiol and Ripert, discussing the reason for allowing the renunciation
of acquired prescription, say: "La lot qui prohibe les renonciations anticip~es, autorise au contraire les renonciations faites apr~s coup, quand la
prescription est accomplie (Art. 2220). 11 n'ya plus alors qu'un intdret particulier en jeu: celui qu est prot~g6 par la prescriptionpeut, d son choix, on
se servir de ce moyen ou y renoncer; il ne fait que disposer de son droit."
Traitd Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais, t. 3, nO 752 (ed. 1926). (The law,
which prohibits the advance renunciation of prescription, authorizes on the
contrary, the renunciation after the event, when the prescription is accomplished [Art. 2220] [Art. 3460, La. Civil Code of 1870]. The law no longer has
a particular interest: he who is protected by prescription can enjoy its protection or renounce it, as he pleases; he only disposes of his right.)
13. The court cited English v. Blackman, 189 La. 255, 268, 179 So. 306, 311
(1938), in which it was said: "Since they had not been exercised and the
running of prescription against them had not been interrupted within the
ten-year period after their execution, they expired, became extinct. They
were dead things, and the mere acceptance of the benefits of the new lease
thereafter did not resurrect them. Accrued prescriptions cannot be 'interrupted' of course." In this case interruption by acknowledgment was
pleaded, not renunciation.
The court also cited Porter-Wadley Lumber Co. v. Bailey, 110 F. 2d 974,
976 (5th Cir. 1940). In that case it was said: "The inconsistency of their
position is that they claim to have been thus perpetuated in rights of which
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cluded that, "since the servitude in this case has become extinct,
it cannot be re-created or established anew except by title."14
This holding seems to indicate that even an express renunciation
of acquired prescription, after ten years non-user, would not
effectively revest title in the mineral owner.
Defendants who had purchased a portion of Gleason's rights
contended that their reliance on the public records estopped
plaintiff from denying their ownership. There is some confusion
as to what faith can be placed in the public record when dealing
with mineral rights. In Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate15 the
court said, "The mineral and royalty owners who acquired their
rights on the faith of the public records after the ... agreement
was registered are obviously protected. '16 However, in subsequent cases the court has used such language as "[a] third person purchasing, on the faith of the public records, . . .is only
required to ascertain if the recorded owner . . ." has kept the
servitude alive (italics supplied) 17 thus indicating that the records could not be relied upon completely. In the instant case the
court held that one who purchases mineral rights must determine whether the rights have prescribed when the records show
that the servitude has been in existence more than ten years,
even if this entails a search behind the records.
Roy M. Lilly, Jr.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-RATE MAKING-PRUDENT INVESTMENT
THEORY-NON UTILITY FUNCTIONS

Appellant, Gulf States Utilities Company, applied to the
Louisiana Public Service Commission for authority to increase
its rates for electric service in the State of Louisiana. The comthey have already been irrevocably divested by operation of law. In order to
show a renewal of their servitudes, they must prove Bailey's intention to
create new rights. . . . Acceptance of rentals under such circumstances does
not resurrect mineral servitudes which have become prescribed, either on
the theory of tacit renunciation or estoppel." The court in the Porter-Wadley
case did not give an opinion as to whether such a renunciation could be made.
14. 62 So. 2d 653, 656 (La. 1952).
15. 195 La. 866, 197 So. 583 (1940). In the Brown case there was a conflict
as to each alleged owner's share of the mineral estate. There was evidence
that some of the rights had prescribed. The interested parties executed a
pooling agreement which set forth each owner's respective share. This
instrument- was notarized and recorded, and other parties bought on the
faith of this instrument on the record.
16. 195 La. 866, 892, 197 So. 583, 592 (1940).
17. Braswell v. Columbia County Development Co., 153 La. 691, 694, 96 So.
534, 535 (1923).

